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I. INTRODUCTION

Medical negligence is an epidemic in the United States. The Harvard
Medical Practice Study examined hospitals in New York State and found
that 2.1% of all hospitalized patients were injured due to medical error,
causing disability or extended hospital stays.' A 2004 study of hospitals in
Colorado and Utah confirmed the magnitude of this problem.2 Medical
negligence lawsuits result from injures due to acts of medical negligence.
The high costs of medical negligence liability insurance reflect this high
level of medical negligence. The most effective way to reduce the costs of
medical liability insurance is to reduce the incidence of medical negligence.
Misleading and inaccurate myths about the source of the high costs of
medical liability insurance distract attention from the causes of and
solutions to the problems relating to the high cost of medical liability
insurance. These myths serve to confuse the real issues. The myths include
claims that large numbers of "frivolous" medical negligence cases are filed,
that jury awards in medical negligence cases are "skyrocketing," that
patients' access to healthcare is being restricted due to rising insurance
costs, and that physicians practice so-called "defensive medicine" out of
fear of liability. These frequently-repeated myths have been accepted by
many political leaders, who by repeating these myths perpetuate them.
President George W. Bush stated:

1.
Christina 0. Jackiw, Comment, The CurrentMedicalLiability InsuranceCrisis:
An Overview of the Problem, Its Catalysts and Solutions, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 505, 511

(Summer 2004) [hereinafter Health Law Colloquium].
2.
Id.

2006]

MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE LiTIGATION is NOT THE PROBLEM

What's happening all across this country is that lawyers are
filing baseless suits against hospitals and doctors. That's
just a plain fact. And they're doing it for a simple reason.
They know the medical liability system is tilted in their favor. Jury awards in medical liability cases have skyrocketed in recent years. That means every claim filed by a
personal injury lawyer brings the chance of a huge payoff
or a profitable settlement out of court. That's what that
means. Doctors and hospitals realize this. They know it's
expensive to fight a lawsuit, even if it doesn't have any
merit. And because the system is so unpredictable, there is
a constant risk of being hit by a massive jury award. So
doctors end up paying tens of thousands, or even hundreds
of thousands of dollars to settle claims out of court, even
when they know they have done nothing wrong.3
Proponents and opponents of medical negligence tort reform agree that
medical negligence liability insurance rates have greatly increased during
recent years. 4 The medical negligence liability myth is not that there has
been an increase in insurance premiums; the myth is the misplacing of the
blame, the exaggeration of the results, and what the proposed solutions
Economically-powerful organizations, including
would accomplish.
medical societies, health insurance plans, and medical liability insurers,
exert great influence in the federal and state legislative arenas and have
spent large sums of money promoting self-serving statutory changes based
on these myths.5 This article will explore the elements of the medical
negligence myths to illuminate the causes of medical negligence liability
and medical liability premium increases, examine the current litigation
system, and offer suggestions as to how to address the main problem, that
of an epidemic of patient injury and medical liability insurance premium
increases.

3. President George W. Bush, Speech at the Gateway Center in Collinsville, IL,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050105-4 (Jan. 5, 2005)
[hereinafter Bush Speech].
4.
ISMIE, Illinois's largest provider of physician negligence insurance, raised its
rates 35% in July, 2003 and another 7% in July, 2004. Keith A. Hebeisen, Caps on
Damages Reward Insurers at the Expense of Those Injured or Killed by Medical Malpractice, 8 TRIAL J. 1 (Winter 2006).
5. Nathan Hershey and Christine M. Jarzab, Looking at Accountability 40 Years
After Darling, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 437, 443 (Summer 2005).
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It. THE MAJOR MYTHS
A. MYTH #1: PLAINTIFFS FILE FRIVOLOUS MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE LAWSUITS

Proponents of tort reform in medical negligence claim that many baseless claims are being filed against doctors and hospitals. 6 The statistics,
simple business sense, and legal procedure do not bear this out for three
reasons: 1) most medical negligence never results in a lawsuit; 2) medical
negligence cases are expensive to prosecute; and 3) medical negligence
lawsuits require certification by a physician in order to be filed in Illinois.
Several studies have demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of
medical negligence injuries do not result in a lawsuit. 7 Most victims of
medical negligence are never compensated for their injuries.8 According to
the Harvard Medical Practice Study, which examined hospitals in New
York State, 2.1% of all hospitalized patients were injured due to medical
error, causing disability or extended hospital stays. 9 A later study investigating hospitals in Colorado and Utah echoed the earlier study's findings.10
Of those injured as a result of medical negligence, the Harvard study
showed that fewer than 2% sued for medical negligence.' 1 That means that
for every injured patient who files a claim, 49 injured patients do not. Even
those patients with the most severe or costly injuries caused by physician
negligence were only compensated one-third of the time, according to the
Harvard study. 12 Several other studies have confirmed this analysis: most
3
medical negligence is not recognized, not litigated, and not compensated.1
The exorbitant expense of prosecuting medical negligence claims is
one reason that many patients injured by medical negligence never receive
compensation in Illinois and other similar states: they cannot find an

6. See, e.g., Statement, Cyril M. Hetsko, AMA: Wisconsin Supreme Court opens
the door for a medical liability crisis, American Medical Association, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/15319.html (July 14, 2005) (discussing the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's declaration that caps on non-economic damages are unconstitutional, and stating that caps are "proven to reduce frivolous lawsuits and stabilize insurance
premiums."); see also Bush Speech, supra note 3.
7.
See, e.g., Hershey & Jarzab, supra note 5, at 442 (citing to The Institute of
Medicine, To Err is Human: Building a Safer HealthcareSystem (2000)).
8.
Joint Econ. Comm., 108th Cong., Liability for Medical Malpractice: Issues and
Evidence 15 (Comm. Study 2003).
9.
Health Law Colloquium, supra note 1, at 511.
10.
Id.
11.
Richard G. Roberts, Understanding the Physician Liability Insurance Crisis,

FAM. PRAC. MGMT., (Oct. 2002), at http:llwww.aafp.orglfpm120021000/47unde.html.

12.
Mark Geistfeld, Malpractice Insurance and the (ll)legitimate Interests of the
Medical Profession in Tort Reform, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 443 (Winter 2005).
13.
Id.
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attorney willing to take their case. 14 Medical negligence lawsuits are
expensive, time-consuming to prosecute, and difficult to win. In order to
file a medical negligence lawsuit in Illinois, a medical negligence plaintiff
must pay filing fees and must retain an independent physician licensed in
the same specialty as the defendant physician who certifies in writing that
he or she has reviewed the pertinent medical records and that there exists a
meritorious claim as to each defendant.' 5 This independent expert must
document the basis for this statement and must disclose his or her name,
address, and license number with the certifying letter. 16 The plaintiff must
pay substantial fees for the independent physician's time to review the
medical records and write the report in order for the injured patient to even
access the courts. 17 The present statute mandates that this report must be
written separately for each defendant with a different specialty, which
makes the certification letters more cumbersome and expensive and makes
filing medical negligence lawsuits even more expensive.' 8 To pursue a
claim through trial costs an average of $35,000 to $50,000.'9 Only half of
the plaintiffs who file lawsuits actually receive any compensation. 20 Of
cases that go to trial, plaintiffs win a verdict only 29% of the time.2 '
Because the costs and the difficulty in winning compensation for the
injured patient are so high, and because of the statutory restriction on fees
in Illinois for medical negligence cases, 22 plaintiffs' attorneys carefully
screen their potential clients, accepting only those cases with strong liability
and high damages.23 Because of the high cost and because they are always
Monique A. Anawis, Presentation: Tort Reform 2003, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
14.
CARE L. 309, 314 (2003) ("[W]hat happens to them is what happens in California. They
can't get lawyers. Cases fall through the cracks ... and that's exactly what the reformers
want.").
15.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2005).
Id.
16.
See Miller v. Gupta, 672 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (1996) ("[T]he legislature has made
17.
the certificate of merit a condition of proceeding with a meritorious malpractice action.").
See also Sherrod v. Ramaswamy, 732 N.E.2d 87 (5th Dist. 2000) (holding that a dismissal
on the basis that the plaintiff did not file the appropriate physician report pursuant to 735
ILL. COMP. STAT

5/2-622 was a "dismissal on the merits").

18.
2005 Ill. Laws P.A 94-677 (modifying 735 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/2-622).
William P. Gunnar, M.D., Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising Medical
19.
MalpracticePremiums?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 465, 479 (Summer 2004).
20.
Health Law Colloquium, supra note 1, at 510.
21.
Roberts, supra note 11. That plaintiffs do not achieve a verdict for their clients
so often does not result from frivolous lawsuits, but rather is due to the burden of proof and
the complexities inherent in a medical malpractice case. See Herbert M. Kritzer,
Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22, 24
(1997) (noting that because contingent fee lawyers only succeed if the cases they accept
succeed, attorneys screen out frivolous lawsuits).
22.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1114 (2005).
Gunnar, supra note 19.
23.
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faced with a fierce defense, 24 plaintiffs' attorneys err on the side of
rejecting, rather than accepting, difficult cases. 25 The economic reality of
the business of the practice of law mandates that plaintiffs' attorneys cannot
afford to file medical negligence lawsuits unless there is a high likelihood
of liability and a severe injury involved. Empirical research supports this
claim, as only one-third of even those most severely injured ever receive
compensation for their injuries.2 6 Not only are there few frivolous claims
being filed, but most of the meritorious claims are not filed either.
Another factor mitigating against the claim that plaintiffs and their
attorneys are filing baseless claims for medical negligence is the Rules of
Professional Conduct applicable to attorneys. These Rules explicitly state
that attorneys shall not bring a claim unless there is a basis for doing so that
is not frivolous,27 and shall not advance a claim the lawyer knows is
unwarranted under existing law.28 The Illinois Supreme Court Rules
require that an attorney sign any pleading filed with the court, thereby
certifying that, to the best of his or her knowledge after reasonable inquiry,
the pleading is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law. 29 If a

pleading is signed in violation of this rule, the court, either by motion or its
own initiative, may sanction the attorney or the party, which can include
having to pay all costs incurred to defend the case to the inclusion of a
reasonable attorney's fee.3 ° If there had been an explosion of frivolous
lawsuits, as claimed by tort reform proponents, 1 the attorneys bringing
these cases would be sanctioned by the court. Further legislative action to
prevent frivolous medical negligence lawsuits is unnecessary to combat a
rare problem that already has solutions in place. Defendants, their insurers,
and their attorneys have the tool available of filing a motion pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 to recover their costs for defending the
"frivolous" lawsuits that tort reform proponents claim exist. 32 In twenty24.
25.
26.
27.

Health Law Colloquium, supra note 1, at 511.
Gunnar, supra note 19.
See Anawis, supra note 14, at 311.
IiL. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.1 (2005).
ILL. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.2(f) (2005).
ILL. SuP. CT. R., R. 137 (2005).

28.
29.
30. Id.
31.
See, e.g., Bush Speech, supra, note 3. See also Press Release, Out of Control
Insurance Premiums Driving Florida's Healthcare to Crisis Point, Florida Medical

Association, available at
http://www.flains.org/newfic/mediapublic/latebreakingnews/fmaonmedmal53002.pdf
(May
30, 2002).
32.
See, e.g., Press Release, Paul Votes to Curb FrivolousLawsuits, Rep. Ron Paul,
available at http://www.house.gov/paul/press/press2004/pr091604.htm
("Too many
attorneys file too many frivolous lawsuits ... [m]edical malpractice lawsuits especially have
gotten out of control.") (Sept. 16, 2004).

20061

MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE LITIGATION IS NOT THE PROBLEM

two years of legal practice and thirty-eight years of medical practice, this
author has never seen such a motion filed or granted.
B. MYTH #2: SKYROCKETING JURY AWARDS ARE CAUSING PREMIUMS
TO RISE

The size of awards in medical negligence cases is primarily driven by
the medical care costs of the injured patient. 33 Litigation behavior and
medical negligence claim payments did not change in any significant,
systemic sense between 1970 and 1975, between 1981 and 1986, or
between 1996 and 2001 (previous medical negligence "crises"). 3 4 Medical
negligence tort costs have risen at an annual rate of 11.9%, only slightly
higher than the rate of 9.5% for other types of tort cases.35 Medical
negligence judgments have increased at the same rate as medical inflation.36
The difference between medical negligence and other tort cases is
attributable to the increased costs for medical care, since a large portion of a
plaintiff s award will be to cover past and future medical care that resulted
from the negligence of the defendants.37 Any claims that "skyrocketing
awards" are due to something other than the high cost of healthcare are
unsupported and deceptive.38
The medical negligence tort system tends to undercompensate rather
than overcompensate medical negligence victims. 39 Empirical studies have
shown that the most severely-injured plaintiffs receive only 10-20%
compensation on marginal losses. 40 The total amount of medical negligence liability is significantly less that the total cost to the economy that
results from the injuries caused by medical negligence.4 ' Physicians and

Roberts, supra note 11.
33.
34.
Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 394 (Winter 2005) (citing David J. Nye & Donald G. Gifford, The
Myth of the Liability Insurance Claims Explosion: An EmpiricalRebuttal, 41 VAND. L. REV.
909 (1988)); Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of MedicalMalpractice
Litigation:Insights from Florida,54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315 (Winter 2005).
Symposium, A Physician's Perspective on the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 13
35.
ANNALS HEALTH L. 623, 628 (Summer 2004).

Health Law Colloquium, supra note 1, at 514 (citing Americans for Insurance
36.
Reform (AIR), Medical MalpracticeInsurance: Stable Losses/Unstable Rates 4 (2002)).
Baker, supra note 34, at 443.
37.
Lewis Laska & Katherine Forrest, Faulty Data and False Conclusions: The
38.
Myth of Skyrocketing Medical MalpracticeVerdicts, COMMONWEAL INSTITUTE (Oct. 2004).
Geistfeld, supra note 12, at 443.
39.
Id. This means that for each 1% increase in injury, the claimant would receive
40.
only 0.1-0.2% in additional compensation.
Id. at 443-44.
41.
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other healthcare providers are held accountable for only a modest fraction
of the harm they cause.42
The total amount of insurance premiums collected in 2003 was $215
billion.4 3 The share attributable to medical negligence premiums was only
$11 billion. This number is insignificant when compared to the more than
$1.5 trillion spent on healthcare that same year. Costs constituting less than
1% of healthcare costs could hardly have the impact that proponents of the
medical malpractice myth claim." Even if the costs for medical negligence
liability insurance were cut in half, a goal no one expects tort reform to
accomplish, it would only have the potential to reduce healthcare costs by
less than one-half of one percent. 45
Insurance companies are paying out less in claims each year, despite
charging more in premiums. According to the National Practitioners'
Databank, the number of medical negligence payouts have decreased 36%
between 1993 and 2002;46 the amount paid out per claim has risen, but by
less than 6% per year, more than 1% less than the rate of medical inflation.47 ISMIE 4 8 paid out less in actual dollars in 2001 and 2002 than it did
in 1993.49 This reduction in payouts has contributed to record surpluses for
the insurance companies over the past few years, despite their claims of a
litigation "crisis" causing higher premiums.5 °
C. MYTH #3: ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE IS RESTRICTED; DOCTORS ARE
LEAVING THE PROFESSION

Proponents of medical negligence tort reform regularly claim that insurance premiums are driving doctors out of the practice of medicine,

42.
Hershey & Jarzab, supra note 5, at 442.
43. Tom Baker, THE MEDICAL MALPRACICE MYTH 9 (2005).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 503 reported payouts in 2002, 491 in 2003. National Practitioners' Databank.
47. Americans for Insurance Reform (AIR), Medical MalpracticeInsurance: Stable
Losses/UnstableRates 4 (2002), availableat
http://www.insurance-reform.org/StableLosseslL.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
48. Illinois State Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange, the state's largest physician
negligence liability insurance provider.
49. Hebeisen, supra note 4.
50.
Jay Angoff, Falling Claims and Rising Premiums in the Medical Malpractice
Insurance Industry, (July 2005), Commissioned by the Center for Justice & Democracy.
This study analyzed the activities of Illinois insurance companies from 2000-2004 and found
that the amount of premiums collected had more than doubled during that time. Some
companies even increased their premiums while both current and future payouts were
declining.
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causing patients to be abandoned and vulnerable,5 ' a claim that is not new.52
The facts refute these claims. The number of practicing physicians per
capita in the United States 53 and in Illinois 54 has been increasing, not
decreasing. There have always been episodic, focal shortages of doctors in
rural areas, in inner-city neighborhoods, and in the some of the fastestgrowing areas of the country, such as Nevada.55 These shortages, which
have been a problem for many decades, are due to traditional demographic
factors, including social factors such as lifestyle choices of specialists and
their spouses, limited opportunities for professional work for well-educated
spouses of physicians, limited recreational and shopping opportunities,
danger of crime in some inner-city areas, and limited specialized educational opportunities for their children.56 These regions face difficulties in
recruiting other professionals as well, such as teachers, for the same
reasons. These traditional causes for focal physician shortages, which have
existed in rural areas for decades, could be exacerbated by increased
insurance premiums. 57 This exacerbation is due not to increased litigation
in those areas, but rather is due to unfair pricing schematics utilized by
insurers. 58
Obstetrics is often cited as a specialty area from which many physicians have fled, abandoning the practice entirely.5 9 The anecdotal evidence
related by tort reform proponents relies heavily on those doctors who did
not deliver very many babies on a yearly basis. 6° The insurance companies
charge the same premiums to physicians who episodically deliver babies,
such as family practitioners, as they do to obstetricians who deliver
hundreds of babies annually. Instead of continuing to episodically deliver
babies, physician groups have decided instead to funnel this function to
51.
Susan Shaw, Medical Errors and Diabetes Care, Diabetes Health Mag., Mar.
2003, available at http://www.diabeteshealth.com/print,article,2950.html ("Outrageous
liability rates are driving physicians from their practices, leaving patients vulnerable and the
entire field of medicine in a state of turmoil.").
52.
Baker, supra note 43, at 140 (quoting Frank Hamilton, who claimed that
between 1833 and 1856, suits for malpractice were so frequent that many men abandoned
the practice of surgery).
53.
Id. at 141.
54.
Bob Tita, More Docs in Illinois, CRAIN'S CHi. Busi., July 5, 2004 at 3.
55.
Baker, supra note 43, at 144.
56.
U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Medicare Physician Fees: GeographicAdjustment Indices
Are Valid in Design, but Data and Methods Need Refinement, GAO-05-119 (Mar. 11, 2005),
availableat http://www.gao.gov/atext/d05119.txt.
57.
Baker, supra note 43, at 144-45.
58.
Id. at 145.
59.
Bush Speech, supra, note 3 (stating there are "pregnant moms all over America
who are wondering whether or not they're going to be able to find good quality health care
for their child and themselves").
60.
Baker, supra note 43, at 146.
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specialized physicians because the amount paid for liability insurance does
not vary based on the number of deliveries performed. 6 ' Overall, the likely
impact of this specialization has been at worst neutral and possibly positive
for the healthcare outcomes of patients.6 2 More research is needed on the
impact of this specialization on the availability of obstetricians in rural
areas, a problem that has existed for decades, as the bare assertions made by
tort reform proponents are not based on any serious research.63
There are more physicians, per capita, in the United States than there
has ever been before. 64 The number of physicians practicing in Illinois has
also increased, outpacing population growth. Crain's Chicago Business
reported that as of May 2004, the number of licensed physicians in Illinois
was up 5.3% from the previous year. 65 There has been a steady increase in
the number of doctors licensed to practice in Illinois, even in the high-risk
specialty fields from which physicians were supposedly fleeing. 66 The U.S.
General Accounting Office has stated in a report that doctors' groups have
misled and fabricated evidence, or, at the very least, wildly overstated their
case about how medical negligence problems have limited access to
healthcare.67 The GAO has also stated that while some physicians have
moved away from "malpractice crisis" states, the number of physicians per
capita has remained relatively unchanged, indicating consistent accessibility
to healthcare.6 8 The GAO report stated that the reported cases of doctors
leaving are inaccurate or involve relatively few physicians. 69 The anecdotal
"evidence" cited by tort restriction proponents is mainly the result of
normal worker mobility, similar to any other profession. The only
legitimate question remaining is whether distribution of physicians is
impacted negatively (for rural patients' access) due to unfair pricing of
medical negligence liability insurance.7 °

61.
Id.
62.
Id. at 147.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 141.
65.
Tita, supra note 54, at 1.
66.
Christi Parsons & Bruce Japson, Physician Count Clouds Malpractice
Argument, Cm. TmRI., July 16, 2004, § 3, at 1.
67.
Id.
68.
U.S. Gen. Acct. Off. rep. to Cong. Requesters, Medical Malpractice:
Implications of Rising Premiumson Access to Health Care,GAO-03-836, 35 (2003).
69.
Id.
70.
Baker, supra note 43, at 147.
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D. MYTH #4: DOCTORS, TERRIFIED OF NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY, ROUTINELY
ENGAGE IN "DEFENSIVE MEDICINE"

Proponents of tort reform claim that the high incidence of medical
negligence lawsuits has caused physicians to practice "defensive medicine,"
whereby physicians order additional unnecessary tests and/or procedures to
avoid medical negligence liability, a claim impossible to verify or quantify,
but likely untrue. If a test or procedure were medically unnecessary and
were ordered by a physician, health insurance companies would likely
refuse to pay for it, angering patients who would then have to pay for these
tests or procedures. 7' This has apparently not occurred. The risks of a
medically-unnecessary test or procedure would likely create physician
liability instead of helping him or her avoid liability, and would be
counterproductive.72 The best defense a physician can have against claims
of medical negligence is to not conmit negligent acts. A physician who
documents in the patients' chart a reasonable plan for care, including
diagnosis and treatment, provides his or her own defense.73 It is irrational
and counterproductive (and if it causes injury, negligent) for physicians to
order unnecessary and risky tests or procedures that are not medically
necessary.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the cost of defensive medicine even if it does exist. 74 If medical negligence lawsuits have an effect on
the practice of medicine, they encourage physicians to order additional tests
and/or procedures beneficial to the patient as well as those that may not
71.
See Baker, supra note 43, at 134 ("[T]he increased cost-consciousness of the
managed care movement has pushed back, hard, in the opposite direction. Medical
management appears to have washed out whatever minor impact the gradual risk in medical
malpractice claim payments over the last fifteen years might have had on health-care
costs."). See also Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors:
Theory and Evidence for MalpracticeReform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595 (June, 2002) ("Unlike
traditional fee-for-service providers, capitated providers do not have a financial incentive to
supply health services of marginal necessity or benefit.").
72.
Health Coalition on Liability and Access, Our Goals, at
http://www.hcla.org/mission.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2006) ("[D]efensive medicine that
costs billions, and at times can cause needless suffering.").
73.
Peter G. Teichman & Nicholas E. Bunch, Depositions:Defending Your Care,
FAM. PRAC. MGMT., (July/Aug. 2001), at http://www.aafp.org/fpm/20010700/34depo.html

("Professional competency, clear communication and complete documentation build a
bulwark against claims of malpractice."). See also Peter G. Teichman, Documentation Tips

for Reducing MalpracticeRisk, FAM. PRAC. MGMT., (Mar. 2000), at

http://www.aafp.org/fpm/20000300/29docu.html (providing a system of documentation that
would force physicians to thoroughly explain and document the thought process behind their
care; unless this thought process itself were unreasonable, the physician would avoid
medical negligence liability).
74.
Baker, supra note 43, at 118.
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Distinguishing these types of "defensive medicine" has proven to be
elusive.76 Researchers have had difficulty developing figures that even
claim to accurately measure the extent of defensive medicine."
Evidence suggesting that physicians are engaging in this behavior is
scant at best. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, citing studies by "three
independent, non-partisan governmental agencies," stated that defensive
medicine is not significantly contributing to the cost of healthcare.78
Clinical scenario research has concluded that in only the rarest of occasions
would the fear of medical negligence liability have any influence over a
physician's medical decision making.79 Comparative hospital records
research has confirmed that defensive medicine in obstetrics, one of the
high-risk specialties cited as most likely to engage in defensive medicine, is
at most one-half of one percent of the total obstetric costs. 80 The research is
clear on this point: if there is so-called "defensive medicine" taking place,
defined as tests and/or procedures that are not helpful to the patient, it is not
having an impact on the cost of healthcare. 8'
Even if defensive medicine were a problem, cutting back on tort liability does not seem to be reasonably calculated to solve it. 82 The solution is
for physicians to practice evidence-based medicine, an outcome that is
promoted, not impeded, by medical negligence lawsuits.83 Unnecessary
tests or procedures do not shield physicians from liability; physicians
should engage in behavior that is more likely to prevent medical negligence
liability, such as reasonable planning and diagnosis, rather than simply
ordering procedures or tests that do no more than obfuscate.84
be.

II. THE "SOLUTIONS" TO THE "INSURANCE PREMIUM LIABILITY CRISIS,"
AS ADVANCED BY TORT REFORM PROPONENTS

A. CAPS ON DAMAGES

Proponents of medical negligence tort reform falsely claim that a cap
on non-economic damages is the "single most effective way to moderate
85
premiums - it lowers premiums by about fifteen to eighteen percent.'
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 118-19.
Id.
Id. at 119.
Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 488 (Wis. 2005).
Baker, supra note 43, at 123-24.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 121,134.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
Teichman & Bunch, supra note 73; Teichman, supra note 73.
See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 11 (discussing the MICRA reforms in California).
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Assertions like this, commonly heard in the media from tort reform
proponents, 86 are simply false. States with caps on damages have premiums
9.8% higher than those without. 87 Representatives of the insurance
companies even admit that a cap on damages will not result in lower
premiums.88
Despite these facts, when signing into law a cap on non-economic
damages, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich stated, "with this legislation,
we're taking a major step forward to make sure that doctors keep practicing
in Illinois, and people get the medical care they need." 89 The Governor
implied that a cap would keep doctors in Illinois because of its effect on
medical negligence insurance premiums. The experience of those states
with caps has shown that they have no downward effect on insurance
premium rates, serving only to raise profits for insurance carriers. 9° A
damages cap does not facilitate experience rating, does not even out pricing
by region, or otherwise make medical negligence liability premiums more
fair.9 1 This is no solution to any perceived "crisis" in medical negligence
insurance; it is only a subsidy to insurance companies taken from the
pockets of those most seriously injured as a result of proven medical
negligence.
Some tort reform proponents falsely point to the MICRA reforms in
California as evidence that caps on non-economic damages work to reduce
medical negligence insurance premiums.92 This is not the case. Between
1975 (passage of MICRA) and 1988, insurance premiums increased 450%

86.

See, e.g., Randolph W. Pate & Derek Hunter, Code Blue: The Casefor Serious

State Medical Liability Reform, in EXECUTIVE SUMMARY BACKGROUNDER No. 1908, (Jan.

17, 2006), at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/bg1908.cfm.
87.
Medical Liability Monitor, (Oct. 2004).
88.
See, e.g., Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, Nation's Largest
Medical Malpractice Insurer Declares Caps on- Damages Don't Work, Raises Docs'
Premiums (Oct. 26, 2004), at
http://www.iltla.com/Medical%20Malpractice/FTCRMedMal10-26_04.pdf.
See also
Kevin J. Conway, Editorial, Tort Reform Won't Lower Malpractice Premium, Cm. TRIB.,
Jan. 11, 2005, at 14 ("Insurance company executives have repeatedly stated that they would
not reduce premiums after enactment of caps on non-economic damages.").
89.
Press Release, Governor Rod Blagojevich, Gov. Blagojevich signs medical
malpractice reform: Legislationdesigned to improve access to physician care in Illinois, at
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=4228
(Aug.
25, 2005).
90.
Hebeisen, supra note 4.
91.
Baker, supra note 34, at 440.
92.
See, e.g., Cooperative of American Physicians, Inc., MICRA, Questions and
Answers, at http://www.cap-mpt.com/legislative-corner/micra-q_anda.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2006) ("Eliminating the current $250,000 non-economic damages cap could increase
the cost of health care in California by more than $6 billion per year.").
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in California and reached an all-time high.93 It was insurance reform
enacted in 1988 that caused insurance rates to stabilize in the intervening
seventeen years and caused insurance companies to be forced to refund
millions of dollars to insured physicians. 94
Medical negligence tort reform proponents falsely claim that "runaway
juries" are awarding unreasonablyhigh amounts of non-economic damages
in medical negligence cases. 95 They falsely claim that the institution of a
cap on non-economic damages will prevent emotionally-inflamed juries
from "punishing" doctors by issuing an unreasonable award.96 This flawed
argument ignores the equitable remedy of remittitur. 97 If an award were
truly unreasonably high, the judge would have the discretion to lower the
award to a reasonable level. 98 This means that the awards that tort reform
proponents truly seek to eliminate are those where the judge has denied a
motion for remittitur, thus determining that the verdict was high but
reasonable. 99 Reducing high but reasonable awards for damages from
proven medical negligence by arbitrary caps only increases the profits of
medical negligence insurers by depriving compensation from those who
have proven to deserve it most.
A de facto cap already exists which restricts medical liability insurance company payouts: the insurance policy limits. With the exception of
bad-faith failure to settle claims, insurance companies are only obligated to
93.
Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, How Insurance Reform
Lowered Doctors' Medical Malpractice Rates in California: And How Malpractice Caps
Failed, at 1 (Mar. 7, 2003), at
http://www.iltla.com/Medical%20Malpractice/HowlnsuranceReformLowered.pdf.
94.
Id.
95.
See, e.g., Hiran Ratnayake, Malpractice limits choices for expectant moms in
Del.; High cost of insurance premiums in state has forced some doctors to stop practicing
their chosen specialty, THE NEWS-JOURNAL (Wilmington, DE), May 29, 2005, at 1A ("[T]he
Physician Insurers Association of America, a group that has member organizations that
insure 60% of the nation's physicians, blames rising rates on runaway jury verdicts and
frivolous lawsuits." ).
96.
Bruce L. Allen & Josef E. Fischer, Caps on malpractice awards: Update, 84
Bulletin of the American College of Surgeons, No. 6 (June 1999), at
http://www.facs.org/ahp/proliab/0699a.html.
97.
See, e.g., Buckholtz v. MacNeal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 162, 168-69 (1st Dist. 2003)
(Stating that a verdict can be set aside by a court if it is "so excessive as to indicate that the
jury was moved by passion or prejudice, or that it exceeds the necessarily flexible limits of
fair and reasonable compensation or is so large that it shocks the judicial conscience.").
98.
See, e.g., Henry v. St. John's Hosp., 563 N.E.2d 410 (I11.1990); Richter v.
Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 532 N.E.2d 269 (1st Dist. 1988).
99.
It is also interesting to note that large non-economic damage awards would be
money that goes to the patient to compensate him or her for pain and suffering, loss of
consortium, loss of quality of life, etc. or to the family of the patient to compensate them for
their loss. The major part of the economic damage award goes back into the insurance and
healthcare system as past and future medical care needs. Hebeison, supra note 4.
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pay out the limits of their policy, often as low as $1 million. Since
settlements of meritorious lawsuits rarely exceed the insurance policy
limits, the limits effectively create a cap on both economic and noneconomic damages. Enforcement of a verdict in excess of insurance policy
limits is extremely rare. This author is only personally aware of this
occurring once in his thirty-eight year career spanning three states.
The same types of arguments regarding the moderation of insurance
premium rates were proffered in support of the cap on damages passed in
Texas. Prior to the passage of the Texas cap, the Texas Department of
Insurance estimated that the measure would save physicians 8.5-11% on
premiums.' °° After the passage of the cap, the two largest insurers in the
state did not reduce medical negligence insurance premiums but rather
sought to raise them by 19 and 35%.'0'
The claims by proponents of caps on non-economic damages can be
refuted by basic theories of economics and rational business behavior. The
goal of any profit-seeking business is to maximize profit. 0 2 This goal is
accomplished by determining the price at which the firm may maximize
revenue, that is, the total amount of money brought in from the sale of their
good or service. If this amount is greater than the cost to produce the good,
the firm will produce it. If the firm is able to lower costs after it is already
engaged in the production of the good, the firm will not lower the price, as
it is already set at the revenue-maximizing level. The best ways to induce a
in response to lower costs to produce are competition
firm to lower prices
03
and regulation.
Insurance companies set their premium rates based upon "what the
market will bear.' ' 4 If the companies raised their premium rates beyond
the price physicians were willing to pay, they would not be rationally
maximizing their revenues. For insurance companies to blame the price
increases on medical negligence litigation is disingenuous considering
economic theory and rational business decision-making.

Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, Medical Malpractice,Insurance and Doctor
100.
Discipline Issues at 4 (Feb. 2005), availableat
http://www.iltla.com/Medical%20Malpractice/ITLA-med-mal-position-paper-05.pdf.
Id.
101.
See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE & CAUSES OF THE
102.
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). See also HOwARD S. DYE ET AL. ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES,
PROBLEMS, AND PERSPECTIvES 324 (1962); CAMPBELL R. McCoNNELL, ECONOMICS:
PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 85 (1978).
DYE et al., supra note 102, at 328.
103.
MCCONNELL, supra note 102, at 372 (discussing rational decision-making in
104.
oligopoly situations).
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B. CHANGES TO SECTION 2-622 (CERTIFICATE OF MERIT)

Section 2-622 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure was designed to
restrict potential plaintiffs' access to the courts by reducing "frivolous"
lawsuits.' 0 5 This provision was made effective as of August 15, 1985. The
prior version of this statute allowed plaintiffs to redact the reviewing
physician's name and address when submitting the certification and
required an affidavit from the submitting attorney that he or she had
consulted with a licensed physician. 1°6 The change in this provision
mandating the disclosure of the plaintiff's consulting expert has no logical
connection to preventing frivolous lawsuits over and above the effect that
the previous version had. The assertion by the sponsor of the tort reforms
overturned by Best v. Taylor Machine Works10 7 stated that the reason for the
disclosure requirement was to "reduce the systemic cost of tort recovery." 0 8 This argument makes no sense. Forcing plaintiffs to contact
additional experts willing to disclose their names, addresses, and license
numbers, reduces the number of physicians available to certify these cases,
which are especially unpopular among physicians. Decreased supply of a
commodity or service tends to cause an increase in the price charged for
that commodity or service. 1°9 Reducing the supply of physicians willing to
certify cases increases the cost of tort recovery, reduces the amount
recovered by injured patients, and reduces their access to the courts.
Disclosure of the name, address, and license number of a physician
certifying cases against physicians in these emotionally-charged lawsuits
makes it more likely that physicians willing to assist plaintiffs in recovering
for their injuries caused by medical negligence will be ostracized by some
of their peers.t 10

105.
DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1142 (I11.
1992) ("Section 2622 is designed to reduce the number of frivolous suits that are filed and to eliminate such
actions at an early stage, before the expenses of litigation have mounted.").
106.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2003).
107.
689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997).
108.
Kirk W. Dillard, Illinois' Landmark Tort Reform: The Sponsor's Policy
Explanation, 27 Loy. U. Cm.L.J. 805, 810 (1996).
109.

See generally ADAM SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).

110.
See, e.g., Medical Justice Corp., http://www.medicaijustice.com (last visited
Mar. 9, 2006). Medical Justice is an organization that seeks to obtain license suspensions
and removal of physicians from medical associations for testifying against its members in a
"frivolous" fashion; this organization does not seek punishment of physicians who testify
falsely or fraudulently on behalf of defendant physicians. Michael J.Sacopulos, Addressing
False Expert Witness Testomony in Medical Malpractice Litication, 9 HEALTH LAWYERS
NEWS 5 at 24 (May 2005) (discussing "hired gun" expert witness testimony).
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Intimidation and censure of plaintiff expert witnesses by neurology
and neurosurgery organizations has frequently occurred, directed solely
against plaintiff experts and never against defense experts.
Neurologists who testify in court are coming under tighter
scrutiny by medical authorities who are seeking to weed
out unqualified witnesses from the courtroom. In a move
that has irked plaintiffs' attorneys, the American Academy
of Neurology (AAN) recently revamped its 16-year-old
guidelines regarding expert witness testimony by neurologists. The new guidelines were formally adopted earlier
this year, but will not go into effect until Jan. 10, 2006. The
AAN maintains that the guidelines, which call for tougher
expert credentials and warn against doctors advocating for
lawyers, are a response to several complaints by physicians
about unqualified witnesses."
There is no empirical evidence that measures like ILCS 5/2-622 in any
form have provided benefit to any participant in the medical negligence tort
system, but evidence does exist that measures like Section 2-622 cause
significant costs to be incurred. 1 2 The substantial and increased costs
incurred to gain access to the courts, which are born by plaintiffs, restricts
less severely-injured plaintiffs from access to the courts. ILCS 5/2-622 has
been in existence for more than twenty years, yet there is no objective
evidence that this onerous burden to plaintiffs has improved the medical
negligence tort system.
C. FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON EXPERT WITNESSES

Public Act 94-677 prescribed further restrictions on who could testify
on behalf of an injured plaintiff as an expert witness. 3 Presently, the court
must consider whether an expert is board-certified, board-eligible, or has
completed a residency in the same or substantially similar specialty as the
defendant.1 4 The expert must now be dedicating a majority of their work
time to the specialty, either practicing, teaching, or researching." 5 The
expert must provide evidence of active practice and that they have the same
class of license as each defendant. If the expert is retired, they must show
111.
Tresa Baldas, Move to Crack Down on Expert Witnesses, NATIONAL L. J. (Dec.
19, 2005).
112.
Jeffrey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to
Special Certificates of Merit?, 1997 BYU L. REv. 537, 577.
113.
2005 I11.Laws P.A. 94-677 (modifying 735 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/8-2501).
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
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that they have completed medical education courses for the three years
preceding their 6testimony, and if they have been retired for five years, they
cannot testify. 1
These restrictions purport to eliminate frivolous testimony but in reality only restrict plaintiffs' access to the courtroom by making litigation
more expensive for plaintiffs by reducing the pool of available expert
witnesses and increasing the number of expert witnesses required. In cases
against multiple defendants, the plaintiff would need separate certifications
for each defendant, each of which would likely add $1,000 or more to the
cost for filing a claim. Expert testimony and deposition costs would
increase by the number of physicians with different specialties, costs which
are not taxable to negligent defendants when a plaintiff achieves a
verdict.1 17 These additional restrictions provide defendants with grounds to
object to expert witnesses based on proofs as to the status of their practices
and continuing education, lengthening the litigation process and further
increasing the costs to plaintiffs. The effect of these new provisions will
result in more litigation, not less, just as the original version of Section 2622 has. 1 8 The provisions regarding retired physicians are to be applied as
of the date of testimony; if an expert physician retires during the pendency
of a case, and the defense is successful in delaying the case for five or more
years (not uncommon in large medical negligence cases), plaintiffs would
lose their expert witness, bear the substantially increased costs for duplicate
experts, and may be unable to succeed in their claim. 19
D. OTHER DIFFICULTIES UNIQUE TO MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASES

These "reforms" are in addition to the burdens already placed on
medical negligence plaintiffs vis-A-vis other tort plaintiffs. Medical
negligence plaintiffs bear the additional expense of proving their cases only
through expert witnesses except in cases of gross negligence. 20 Medical
21
and restrictions on
negligence plaintiffs face restrictions on discovery'
12 2
attorneys.
plaintiffs'
with
their ability to contract

Id.
116.
117.
Vicencio v. Lincoln-Way Builders, Inc., 789 N.E.2d 290, 294-95 (Ill. 2003).
The term "2-622" currently appears in 177 published appellate decisions and the
118.
sufficiency of a 2-622 certificate of merit is a standard motion presented by most defendants
in medical negligence cases.
119.
Walski v. Tiesenga, 381 N.E.2d 279, 282-83 (Ill. 1977) (expert testimony
required to establish prima facie case).
Id.
120.
See Medical Studies Act, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2101 (2004).
121.
See 735 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/2-1114 (2004).
122.
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E. NATIONAL MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE TORT REFORM PROPOSALS

Congress is currently considering a federal tort reform package that
would restrict medical negligence liability for insurance companies at a cost
to the most severely-injured patients. 123 President George W. Bush made
medical negligence tort reforms like this bill a part of his State of the Union
address on January 31, 2006.124 His bill would limit non-economic
damages to a maximum award of $250,000 and limit punitive damages to
cases where the plaintiff can prove intentional wrongdoing, and would be
limited to $250,000 or double the economic recovery, whichever is
greater. 125 The bill would also restrict plaintiffs' attorneys' fees (but have
no effect on defense attorneys' fees), abolish joint-and-several liability,
allow evidence of collateral sources at trial, and allow defendants to pay
claims gradually over time. 26 Each of these measures restricts access to the
courtroom or lowers money received by patients to the benefit of medical
negligence insurance carriers. That restrictions on attorney fees would
apply only to plaintiffs and not defendants is telling. Assuming arguendo
that the quality of attorneys is related to the fees charged for their services,
this bill would allow for fair compensation for quality defense attorneys but
not for quality plaintiffs' attorneys, who would either be paid less or who
would decline to represent plaintiffs in these cases. As experience with the
MICRA reforms in California and simple economic analysis shows, the
savings, if any, will not be passed on to the consumer
(physicians and their
127
patients) but rather will be retained as profits.

123.
Health Law Colloquium, supra note 1, at 515 (citing H.R. 5, the "Help,
Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare" (HEALTH) Act of 2003).
124.
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-31-sotu-text_x.htm (Jan. 31, 2006)
("And because lawsuits are driving many good doctors out of practice, leaving women in
nearly 1,500 American counties without a single OB-GYN, I ask the Congress to pass
medical liability reform this year.").
125.
Health Law Colloquium, supra note 1, at 515. Punitive damages are already
proscribed in Illinois for healing arts malpractice cases. 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/2-1115
(2003).
126.
Health Law Colloquium, supra note 1, at 515.
127.
See Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, Medical Malpractice Talking Points,
available at http://www.iltla.com/Medical%20Malpractice/medmal-talking-points.PDF (last
visited March 27, 2006).
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IV. THE REAL PROBLEMS - EPIDEMIC MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND UNFAIR
INSURANCE COMPANY PRICING
A. MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE IS EPIDEMIC

Injuries from medical negligence are epidemic in the United States.
Ninety-eight thousand people die each year from medical errors in hospitals
alone. 128 This figure does not include those who die from adverse drug
interactions or those who die from medical errors in physicians' offices,
nursing homes, or ambulatory care centers. 29 The Harvard Medical
Practice Study examined hospitals in New York State and found that 2.1%
of all hospitalized patients were injured due to medical error, causing
disability or extended hospital stays. 30 Patients are dying from preventable
medical errors in hospitals at an alarming rate, and the costs to society from
Illinoisans die each
these deaths are staggering. Roughly 1,942 to 4,325
31
year from preventable medical errors in hospitals.
Medical negligence is the problem, not plaintiffs' attorneys or the legal
system which expose only a small portion of this negligence and its
consequences. The cause of the medical negligence epidemic is the
frequent negligent conduct of the healthcare providers: physicians and
hospitals. Medical negligence lawsuits provide a harsh spotlight on this
tragic and continuing epidemic of negligently-caused injuries and deaths
throughout this country. Injured patients and their lawyers are the vocal
messengers of this tragic problem, and solutions designed to muzzle the
message will only exacerbate this epidemic of medically-induced, negligent
injuries and deaths.
The loss to the economy from injuries caused by medical negligence
dwarfs the total amount of medical negligence liability payouts.' 32 "Injured
patients and their lawyers are the messengers here, not the cause of the
medical malpractice problem."1 33 The general level of medical negligence
utilize
premiums is far lower than it would be if patients could efficiently
34
the tort system to receive just compensation for their injuries.'
128.
The Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Healthcare
System (2000) [hereinafter To Err].
129.
Id.
130.
Health Law Colloquium, supra note 1, at 511.
131.
Center for Justice and Democracy,
http://www.centejd.org/TestimonyIL050223.pdf#search='1 %2C942%204%2C325%20medi
cal' (extrapolating from To Err, supra note 128.). This figure also does not include deaths
from medical errors in doctor's offices, ambulatory care centers, drug interactions, and
nursing homes.
Geistfeld, supra note 12, at 443.
132.
133.
Baker, supra note 43, at 3.
134.
Geistfeld, supra note 12, at 444.
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The patient safety problem is not improving. There were an estimated
7,000 deaths in 1993 due to adverse drug interactions. 135 In 1983, ten years
earlier, there were only 2,876.136 One to two percent of all patients
admitted to a hospital encounter a preventable adverse drug event, which
137
increases the cost of healthcare by an average of $4,700 per admission.
Each dollar spent on ambulatory medications leads to another dollar spent
to treat the new health problems caused by the medications. 138 A patient
today is 36% more likely to get infected at the hospital than they were in the
1970s. 139
These trends in medical negligence are much worse than the results
seen in other industries where safety concerns led to improvements. The
commercial airline industry has made it four times less likely that a
passenger will die in a domestic flight between the 1960s and 1970s and
1990.140 The death rate from workplace injuries has been cut in half
between 1970 (when OSHA was created) and 1996.141 Anesthesiologists
have reduced their mortality rates from 2 per 10,000 to 1 per 200,000300,000.142 They accomplished this through: 1) technological changes; 2)
information, especially guidelines and standards; 3) better training,
including simulators; and 4)43formation of a foundation to provide leadership
and direction for research. 1
Several factors account for this problem. There are insufficient positive economic incentives in place to encourage high-quality care and some
that may discourage high-quality care. Unlike traditional fee-for-service
providers, providers paid "per capita" have no financial incentive to supply
health services of marginal necessity or benefit. 144 The capitated physician
paid "per capita" is paid the same amount no matter how much time the
physician spends with the patient, how diligent the physician is with followup, or how many and how extensive the tests and/or procedures the
physician performs or orders. Capitation agreements create economic
disincentives for doctors to perform beneficial tests or procedures, as the
cost for these
would come directly out of the profit margin of their
14 5
practice.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
INVESTOR'S

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

To Err, supra note 128, at 27.
Id. at 26-27, 32.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 41.
Betsy McCaughey, Hospitals' Dirty Little Secret: Infections Now Are Rampant,
Bus. DAILY, Aug. 2, 2002, at A16.
To Err,supra note 128, at 71.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 144-45.
Id. at 144-45.
Mello & Brennan, supra note 71, at 1595.
Id. at 1595.
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Hospitals are faced with economic disincentives to improve quality of
care and to discover and disclose system failures and poorly-trained
personnel. A physician who handles a large number of patients is more
profitable for a hospital, but often creates the greatest medical negligence.
Hospitals lack the incentive to train their physicians or improve the delivery
system for healthcare as these activities would take physicians away from
revenue-producing patient care. Insufficient economic incentives exist to
encourage high-quality care and to discourage low-quality care.
Oversight of physicians outside of the hospital setting is under-funded
and woefully limited. Negligent doctors have little risk from the licensing
boards of Illinois. The Department of Professional Regulation took action
against only 34 of 39,000 practicing physicians for incompetence,
negligence, or gross misconduct in 2002.'46 Since a license to practice
medicine is a state-controlled monopoly, the usual laws of supply and
demand are not operational. The supply of physicians is limited by the
state's licensing of physicians. The supply of medical specialists is tightly
controlled by the American Board of Medical Specialties, which controls
the number of training programs, the number of doctors permitted to train
in those programs, and by its examination systems, the number of specialists in every area. If a shortage of physicians and specialists exist,
increasing the number of physicians is the obvious solution, not limiting
their liability for proven negligence.
Insufficient negative economic incentives exist to discourage lowquality care. Demand for physicians' services does not decrease based on
the poor quality of care; in fact, the opposite seems to be true. 147 Medical
negligence tort measures, limiting access to the courtroom and reducing just
compensation paid to patients injured by negligent physicians, decreases the
economic incentives for improvement in healthcare services even further,
endangering rather than protecting the safety of the patient. "[A]ll the
research that has been done so far points in the same direction: tort reform
does not improve health-care outcomes. If anything, the research suggests
that at least some kinds of tort reforms might have a detrimental effect on
,,48
health ....
Caps on non-economic damages sends a mixed message to healthcare
providers and organizations. Rather than improve the quality of care and
reduce the frequency and severity of injuries, the costs of these injuries will
be born by the most severely injured rather than the negligent tortfeasor.
146.
Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, Medical Malpractice,Insurance and Doctor
DisciplineIssues, availableat
http://www.iltla.com/Medical%2OMalpractice/ITLA-med-mal-position-paper_05.pdf (last
visited Mar. 27, 2006).
See Mello & Brennan, supra note 71, at 1595.
147.
Baker, supra note 43, at 148.
148.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court, while invalidating that state's noneconomic damage cap, stated, "it is a major contradiction to legislate for
quality medical care on one hand, while on the' 149
other hand, in the same
statute, to reward negligent healthcare providers."
Reducing the incentive for injured patients and plaintiffs' lawyers to
file lawsuits punishes the injured patient and her messenger to the benefit of
the negligent healthcare provider and its insurer. 150 Factors which highlight
the current medical negligence epidemic can only extend the problem and
delay solutions to the source of the medical negligence epidemic: the
negligent conduct of physicians and hospitals.
B. INSURANCE UNDERWRITING CYCLE

The high cost of medical liability insurance is a problem which requires a solution. The solution, in addition to reducing the incidence of
medical negligence injuries, lies in examining the basis for exorbitant
medical liability insurance premiums.
Medical negligence liability
insurance premiums track closely with the stock market and with the profits
earned by insurance companies from their investments. "The insurance
underwriting cycle is an insurance industry-specific business cycle that
consists of alternating periods in which insurance is priced below cost (a
'soft market') and periods in which insurance is priced above cost (a 'hard
market').' 15 1 Insurance companies make most of their money by investing
the premiums from policies sold. 52 The soft market occurs during a period
of high investment market returns, when insurance companies are fiercely
153
competing for premium dollars to invest in these favorable conditions.
The soft market occurs during a period of high investment market returns,
when insurance companies are fiercely competing for premium dollars to
invest in these favorable conditions. 154 When investment income decreases,
the industry responds by raising prices and reducing coverage, calling the
phenomenon a "liability insurance crisis."' 5 5 This natural cycle in the
insurance industry gives rise to unfair pricing cycles for physicians and
gives insurance companies the opportunity to blame the price increases on

149.
Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 464 (Wis. 2005).
150.
Baker, supra note 43, at 3.
Baker, supra note 34, at 396.
151.
152.
Current Issues Related to Medical Liability Reform: Before the Subcommittee
on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of J. Robert Hunter, Director of
Insurance).
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
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factors outside the insurance community, particularly the medical negligence tort system.
V. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE: REAL SOLUTIONS
A. DEMAND FOR PHYSICIANS AND MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY
INSURANCE RATES MUST VARY BASED ON QUALITY OF CARE

The limited availability of information regarding the quality of care
delivered by physicians limits the ability of patients to evaluate and identify
physicians who provide poor quality of care. As one author stated the
problem, "[T]he available data suggests that there is not much elasticity of
demand associated with perceptions of quality in healthcare. In fact, the
evidence seems to suggest the opposite."' 56 In order for the public to be
able to choose doctors based on their quality of care, information about the
conduct of individual physicians must be available to patients when
choosing their physician. A small proportion of doctors are responsible for
the lion's share of medical negligence payouts. In Illinois, 3.6% of the
practicing doctors are responsible for 47% of the medical negligence
payouts. 157 If this information were available to patients when they were
making their physician choices, it is likely that these 3.6% of doctors would
see their patient base decrease substantially.
Improved credentialing, surveillance of physician conduct, and monitoring of physician results by insurance companies and governmental
agencies can assist in identifying problem physicians who cause patient
injuries. Providing payments to healthcare providers based upon their
results rather than simply according to the service performed or procedure
performed will create an incentive for physicians to perform these services
carefully, and would penalize careless physicians. Simply increasing the
payment to a physician whose record is that of safety while decreasing the
payments to physicians with poor records will create a strong incentive for
careful thought and planning in the provision of healthcare services. The
present system does not reward high quality of care nor penalize poor
quality of care. The present payment system ignores the laws of capitalism.
Physicians who provide high quality of services pay the same medical
liability insurance premiums as physicians who provide poor healthcare
services. "Good doctors" should pay reduced medical negligence premiums, while negligent physicians who provide poor quality of care services
should pay higher premiums, or for the worst doctors, not be provided
156.
Mello & Brennan, supra note 71, at 1597.
Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, at
157.
http://www.iltla.conVMedical%20Malpractice/ITLAmedmal_position-paper_05.pdf
at page 11 (citing the National Practitioners' Databank).
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insurance at all. The present system does not distinguish or even identify
these healthcare provider groups, except in the worst cases. An individual
physician's medical negligence history, settlement payments, and history of
disciplinary actions by hospitals or licensing boards are not particularly
influential in determining medical negligence liability insurance premiums. 158 Nationwide, 54% of the payouts for medical negligence have
resulted from the conduct of 5% of physicians. 159 These high-risk
physicians do not encounter the proportionate increase in insurance
premium that any accident-prone automobile driver would, increases that
would make business and actuarial sense.' 6° Instead, the risk attributable to
these high-risk individuals is spread to, and paid for by, the other members
of their specialty. 161
Insurance companies rate their physician medical negligence insurance
clients based on location of practice, specialty, and years of practice rather
than their own history of medical negligence or the nationwide averages for
medical negligence in their specialty. 62 This has resulted in uneven
premium rates, especially for doctors in rural areas. 163 This unfair pricing
policy has exacerbated the longstanding problems associated with providing
adequate access to healthcare in rural areas. It is insurance company
pricing policies that are affecting access to medical care, not "greedy
lawyers" and "runaway juries."
B. IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THE PHYSICIAN WORKFORCE THROUGH
INVESTIGATION AND NEUTRAL PEER REVIEW

Medical errors in hospitals cause at least 98,000 deaths per year. 164
This is more than the deaths caused from motor vehicle accidents, breast
cancer, or AIDS. Medical errors in hospitals are the eighth-leading cause of
death in the United States. 165 This number does not include the non-fatal
injuries that occur to nearly 3% of all hospital patients.' 66 The total cost to
the economy for preventable adverse events is $17-29 billion per year. 167
Compare the figures above with the 6,000 annual deaths from workplace
injuries. 168 And yet, OSHA 169 has 2,100 inspectors, plus additional
158.
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investigators, engineers, physicians, educators, standards writers, and other
technical and support personnel,1 70 while the Department of Professional
Regulation17' has only 248 total employees to investigate around one
million licensed professionals in Illinois.172 Nationwide, sanctions from
licensing boards are relatively rare 173 and are an extreme culmination of the
recognition of unprofessional behavior. 174 The sanctioning rate of
physicians is even lower in Illinois.175 Studies have shown that those
physicians that are disciplined by licensing boards are twice as likely to
have failed a course in medical school, have lower MCAT scores,
undergraduate science grade-point average, and NBME scores, and three
times as likely to have demonstrated unprofessional behavior in medical
school. 176 Additional investigation is needed, but could be made more
efficient by more carefully monitoring those physicians with the criteria
enumerated above. As stated by the Institute of Medicine, "the health
system has not had effective ways of dealing with dangerous, reckless,
or
177
incompetent individuals and ensuring that they do not harm patients."'
169.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is a federal agency with a
mission to "assure the safety and health of America's workers by setting and enforcing
standards; providing training, outreach, and education; establishing partnerships; and
encouraging continual improvement in workplace safety and health." Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, Mission Statement, at http://www.osha.gov/oshinfo/mission.html
(last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
170.
Id. This number is nationwide; the number that could be attributed to Illinois,
based on Illinois' percentage of the national population, could be said to be around ninetyone (population figures from www.census.gov).
171.
This is the licensing and disciplinary body that covers physicians along with
many other professions, such as private investigators and insurance agents.
172.
The Department of Professional Regulation monitors, licenses, and disciplines a
wide variety of professions. Since they oversee "nearly one million professionals,"
http://www.idfpr.com/NEWSRLS/FactSheet.pdf, and since there are 39,000 practicing
physicians in Illinois,
http://www.iltla.com/Medical%20Malpractice/ITLA med mal positionpaper_05 .pdf,
it
would follow that 39,000/1,000,000, or approximately 3.9%, of their staff would be involved
in the oversight of physicians. Thus, it follows that there are ten total employees monitoring
the 39,000 practicing physicians in Illinois.
173.
Approximately 0.3% of practicing physicians, or three per one-thousand, have
disciplinary action taken against them by licensing boards. This likely reflects the most
extreme forms of unprofessional behavior. Maxine A. Papadakis et al., DisciplinaryAction
by Medical Boards and PriorBehavior in Medical School, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2673
(2005).
174.
Lynne M. Kirk & Linda L. Blank, ProfessionalBehavior - A Learner's Permit
for Licensure, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2709 (2005).
175.
The Department of Professional Regulation took action against only 34 of
39,000 practicing physicians for incompetence, negligence, or gross misconduct in 2002.
This is less than one per thousand, or one-third the national rate.
176.
Papadakis et al., supra note 173, at 2676.
177.
To Err, supra note 128, at 169.
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Identifying physicians who provide high-quality care and, as importantly, physicians and hospitals that provide poor-quality care is critical to
any real solution to the medical negligence epidemic. At present, patients
are provided limited access to information regarding the identity of
providers of high or poor-quality care. For the marketplace forces to work
effectively, adequate information about physicians who are subjected to
peer-review sanctions, physicians who have had hospital privileges revoked
or limited, state investigations of patient complaints, and lawsuit settlements must be available. Reporting of quality of care parameters for
hospitals should be mandatory, identifying which hospitals have the lowest
mortality rates, lowest infection rates, and lowest morbidity rates for
medical and surgical conditions. The economic forces of patient selection
of providers should be permitted to work, which will help reduce the
number of physicians who provide the bulk of medical negligence injuries
and litigation.
Improved hospital-based peer review methods are necessary to identify physicians who provide negligent healthcare services. Peer review
(mortality and morbidity committees) are currently conducted within the
hospital or healthcare center where the adverse event occurred. This review
is currently conducted by the physician or health professional's colleagues,
friends, co-workers, and/or supervisors. Friends, colleagues, co-workers,
and supervisors
naturally find a conflict in criticizing those with whom they
78
work.1

Other models would likely reduce or eliminate conflicts of interest.
Peer review can be conducted by demographically-comparable hospitals in
distant cities and states in communities similar to the hospital being
reviewed. Peer review can be performed by physicians and nurses who
have no contact, no loyalties, and no bias in favor of those being reviewed,
leading to an analysis of care that is more objective. Data which specifically identifies the name of the patient and the healthcare provider can be
deleted from the records reviewed. More stringent and effective review is
likely and correction of errors in conduct or in the systems and/or procedures are more likely, which may lead to the more rapid discovery of
impaired physicians. These corrections would result in better health
outcomes for patients and reduced injuries. There would be no additional
cost to healthcare providers for this model, as they are already performing
peer review functions. The only difference would be that the reviewing
178.
In psychology terms, there are two biases at play in this situation. The first is
called "ingroup bias" and the second is called "mere exposure bias." These psychological
theories basically state that one looks more positively on that with which they are familiar.
See, e.g., Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPH SUPPLEMENT, (June 1968), at 1, 9.
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would be of the conduct and systems from another medical care center
instead of their own. Candor and honesty in these peer reviews should be
by maintaining the privilege
encouraged, which could be accomplished
79
over the substance of these reviews.
C. INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS AND SPECIALISTS

In order to encourage the medical profession to examine its methods
and procedures, the public must create the economic incentives for it to do
so. Restoring the effects of supply and demand on physician services can
work to allow marketplace forces to identify and reward physicians who
provide quality care. Increasing the supply of physicians would provide
patients the opportunity to make choices based upon quality of care rather
than simple availability. The limited availability of physicians rather than
quality of care delivered reduces the incentive of patients to choose quality
physicians. Restoring the laws of supply and demand permits economic
forces to reward the quality physicians and to penalize physicians who are
careless and commit medical negligence. By increasing the supply of
physicians and specialists, patients would be able to select their doctors
based upon their quality of care, their ability to communicate, their actions
in promoting well being, and their training, education, and experience. By
traditional standards, shortages of physicians generally do not exist. By
increasing the supply of physicians and specialists, not only will local
shortages be reduced or eliminated, but patients will have the ability to
select physicians based upon quality of care issues rather than simple
availability and proximity to home or work. Real economic incentives
would be created for physicians to practice high-quality care and reduce
unnecessary errors and medical negligence.
D. EMPHASIZE RISK MANAGEMENT

Current standard-setting authorities are not devoting adequate attention
to patient safety issues.1 80 Risk management measures can be implemented
by physicians and healthcare providers to increase the quality of care and
decrease the incidence of preventable injury. These measures can be

179.
See Brian A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance and Damage
Caps: Getting Beyond Band Aids to Substantive Systems Treatment to Improve Quality and
Safety in Healthcare,30 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 503 (2004) ("The present legal landscape...
prevents such communication in the healthcare industry. The adversarial nature of our legal
system punishes candor and rewards the manipulation of fact, thus discouraging open and
honest communication of system issues.").
180.
To Err, supra note 128, at 151.
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patterned after those put into practice by anesthesiologists in the 1980s.18 1
What these specialists did was identify the causes of most claims against
them and implement strategies and standards to avoid them. 8 2 These
practices resulted in a sharp drop in the incidence of injury, negligence
suits, and costs for medical negligence liability insurance.' 83 Other areas
of medical practices have not undertaken these steps to ensure patient
safety. Patients are 36% more likely to contract an infection in a hospital
today than they were in the 1970s.184 Further, 7,000 people may be dying
each year from preventable adverse drug events; 185 this is in addition to the
86
98,000 patients that die each year from preventable medical errors.'
Many of the preventable medication errors would have been caught by
187
computerized systems, which hospitals have been slow to implement.
Doctors make mistakes, but it is important that the profession examine its
standards and procedures as anesthesiologists have done in order to
minimize the incidence of these costly errors. 88 The Institute of Medicine
agrees that guidance is necessary: "[f]or safe and efficient production ....
there is ...a need ... [for] reasonable work schedules
.. .[and] clear
' 89
guidance on desired and undesired performance."'
Educating physicians to develop relationships with their patients will
promote improved quality of care. Promoting good communication with
patients, colleagues and staff, sustaining clinical competence, and maintaining accurate
and legible charts can go a long way toward reducing liability
risk. 190
E. REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF UNREVEALED CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Under the fee-for-service model of patient care, a physician who recommends a procedure or operation and who will be paid for those services
had a disclosed conflict of interest which is readily apparent to the patient.
181.
Insurance Information Institute, Hot Topics and Issues Updates: Medical
Malpractice,at http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal/ (last visited Mar.
27, 2006) (describing anesthesiologists' risk-management measures).
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To Err, supra note 128, at 27.
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Id. at 1.
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Id. at 60.
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Chantal M.L.R. Brazeau, Coping With the Stress of Being Sued, FAM. PRAC.
MGMT,May 2001, at 41, available at http://www.aafp.org/fpmI20010500/41copi.htm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2006).
189.
To Err,supra note 128, at 60.
190.
Richard G. Roberts, Seven Reasons Family Doctors Get Sued and How to
Reduce Your Risk, FAm.PRAC. MGMT, (Mar. 2003), at 29, at
http://www.aafp.org/fpm/20030300/29seve.html.
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Aware of the disclosed conflict of interest, the patient has the option of
seeking additional opinions and referrals, and he can protect himself
accordingly. Under the HMO model of patient care, a "gate-keeper"
primary care physician is often paid a bonus based upon the presence of
remaining funds which have been allocated for his group of patients. Any
money not spent for hospitalization, tests, and procedures is often paid as a
bonus to the "gate-keeper" physician. When the gate-keeper physician is
aware of a test, procedure, or treatment which might be reasonable for the
patient's care but does not choose that treatment for his patient, the
physician has a real conflict of interest which is not readily apparent to the
patient unless disclosed. Legislation should be created to mandate that all
reasonable treatment options be explained to the patient, so that the patient
can make an informed decision. Injuries and deaths have occurred as a
result of the failure of HMO patients to be provided full disclosure of all
reasonable treatment options. 19 1
F. INSURANCE REFORM

Insurance reform, while important in reducing insurance costs, will
have little or no effect on the important goal of patient safety. 92 A
coordinated alignment of regulatory, economic, and professional incentives
along with public perception and external features such as the legal realm
will have the best chance of improving patient safety and may have some
effect on the cost of healthcare services. 93 Changes to the medical
negligence insurance industry, such as removing the anti-trust exemption to
allow more fair competition, regulating the pricing schemes of the
insurance companies, and curbing the misleading accounting practices of
the insurance companies will help align these incentives.
1. EliminateAntitrust Exemption for Medical Negligence Liability
Insurance
The "Medical Malpractice Insurance Antitrust Act of 2003" seeks to
remove the advantages given to insurance companies through exemptions
from anti-trust regulations provided in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.194 The
Act would do away with insurance companies' ability to engage in pricefixing, bid rigging, and market allocations in connection with the business
191.
See, e.g., Hinterlong v. Baldwin, 720 N.E.2d 315, 316-17 (I11.App. Ct. 1999)
(describing HMO capitation agreements).
To Err, supra note 128, at 21.
192.
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Id.

Anawis, supra note 14, at 314.
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of providing medical negligence liability insurance. 195 That insurance
companies have been able to achieve the passage of a law allowing them to
engage in anti-competitive conduct serves as a testament to their lobbying
strength. Insurance companies must be forced to compete with other
competition that efficiency is
insurance companies, for it is through
196
reached.
is
price
fair
the
and
maximized
2. Regulate the InsuranceIndustry's PricingSchematics
The Illinois Department of Insurance has never rejected a rate increase
in its thirty-one years of operation. 97 The recent passage of P.A. 94-677
gave Illinois regulators the authority to reject medical negligence liability
insurance premium increases. 98 The Act calls for an automatic hearing if
1% of the insureds within a specialty or 25% of all insureds so request, or if
the rate increase being considered exceeds 6%. 199 It remains to be seen
whether this authority will have teeth or amount to little more than a
"rubber stamp."
Illinois insurers enjoy the most lax insurance regulation in the United
States. 200 By some accounts, Illinois' lack of regulation allows insurance
companies to avoid a public review of their financial accounts while
simultaneously engaging in price gouging (in an anti-competitive manner)
of physicians and healthcare providers and then blaming the high premiums
on misleading claims of overly-litigious plaintiffs. 20 1 Insurance companies
are currently able to set pricing policies that are unfair to particular
regions.20 2 Insurance companies should be forced to establish pricing
schematics that set premium rates equitably.
3. ProscribeInsurance Companies' MisleadingAccounting Practices
Medical negligence liability insurers inflated their costs (payouts for
medical negligence claims) by an average of 46% each year between 1986
and 1994, according to a study released by the nonprofit, nonpartisan
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Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights.2 °3 This was done was by
projecting an amount that they expected to pay for future claims (so-called
"incurred costs") that was wildly out of proportion to the payouts they
actually would make.204 They would then use these overstated figures as
evidence that insurance premiums for doctors needed to be increased and in
support of their claims that the "medical negligence liability insurance
crisis" necessitated wholesale medical negligence tort reform. 20 ' The
Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights concluded that the rate
increases were neither justified nor necessary and that this accounting
practice was utilized for the purpose of justifying unnecessary rate hikes
and for pressuring legislatures to enact measures to boost their profits even
farther.2°6
VI. CONCLUSION

High medical negligence liability insurance costs are primarily the
result of an epidemic of injuries from medical negligence by healthcare
providers. The costs of these injuries are staggering. The cost of medical
negligence litigation can be best addressed by reducing the frequency of
negligent conduct by physicians and hospitals. Improvements in supervision of physicians, medical service payments and medical liability
insurance premiums which reward high quality of care and penalize
negligent care, and improved peer review of physicians by government,
insurers, and hospitals can improve the quality of care delivered to patients
and can reduce the frequency and severity of patient injuries. Popular
myths have been promulgated which are false, misleading, and will not
solve the problem of medical negligence or the high costs of medical
liability insurance premiums. Statutory attempts to limit medical negligence lawsuits will have minimal effects on the cost of healthcare and serve
only to punish the victims of medical negligence and their attorneys, the
messengers who highlight the enormity of the costs of medical negligence.
Barriers to the filing of medical negligence lawsuits and restrictions on the
payments to those injured by proven negligence will not reduce the medical
liability insurance costs and will not increase the number or availability of
physicians. True reform can only be achieved by reducing the frequency of
negligently-caused patient injuries.
203.
U.S. Newswire, at http://releases.usnewswire.conmGetRelease.asp?id=58720
(last visited Jan. 3, 2006) (citing study found at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/malpractice/rp/5714.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2006)).
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